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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WAITING TO BE AN AMERICAN: THE COURTS’ PROPER ROLE
AND FUNCTION IN ALLEVIATING NATURALIZATION
APPLICANTS’ WOES IN 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B) ACTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION
At the age of 17, Zuhair Mah’d, a Jordanian national, came to the United
States to attend college.1 After finishing college, Mah’d remained in the U.S.,
putting his knowledge to work by making computers for the blind.2 In 2004, in
his 30s, Mah’d applied to become a U.S. citizen.3 However, approximately
two years later, Mah’d’s naturalization application had neither been granted
nor denied by the U.S. government, presumably due to the FBI’s backlog in
conducting name checks.4 Thus, after waiting for more than two years for a
determination on his naturalization application, Mah’d took the FBI and the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to court to receive a
determination on his application.5 Due to the delay, the court ordered USCIS
to issue a decision on Mah’d’s application after the completion of the FBI
background checks, and Mah’d hoped to pick up his citizenship papers shortly
after the decision.6
However, Mah’d is not the only individual who has waited years for a
determination on his naturalization application. Thousands of individuals have
waited for years to receive decisions on both naturalization applications and
permanent-resident applications due to a backlog in the FBI name-check
process.7 As of May 6, 2008, there were 269,943 FBI name checks pending.8
Over 17,000 name checks had been pending for over a year, while close to
5,000 name checks had been pending for nearly three years.9 Since the horrific

1. Day to Day: Background-Check Backlogs Delay Citizenship Bid (NPR radio broadcast
May 2, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9958267
[hereinafter NPR].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. See also Mahd v. Chertoff, No. 06-CV-01023-WDM-PAC, 2007 WL 891867, at
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2007).
6. NPR, supra note 1. See also Mahd, 2007 WL 891867, at *3.
7. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP. 2008, at 6,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual_Report_2008.pdf
[hereinafter
2008
OMBUDSMAN REPORT].
8. Id.
9. Id.
581
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events of September 11, 2001, name checks have slowed down the clearance
process on naturalization applications.10 As a result of long delays, individuals
waiting for determinations on their naturalization applications are in limbo:
they are barred from voting, cannot get certain jobs, have difficulties adopting
children, and can be separated from their families.11 Thus now many
individuals, like Mah’d, are going to court to compel a determination on their
naturalization applications by using 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) to their advantage,
which states:
If there is a failure to make a determination [on the naturalization application
by USCIS] . . . before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the
examination is conducted . . . the applicant may apply to the United States
district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the
matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine
the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to [USCIS] to
12
determine the matter.

However, courts have conflicted over the meaning of this statute. Many
times, once an applicant files an action in a district court pursuant to § 1447(b),
USCIS will deny the application while the action is pending in court. In
situations such as these, some courts have held that the district courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter,13 while other courts have held that the
district courts and USCIS have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter and
consider the matter moot.14 If in fact the court retains jurisdiction over a §
1447(b) action, the court must decide to either remand the case to USCIS with
appropriate instructions or determine whether the naturalization application
should be granted.15 For different reasons, courts have split on this issue as
well.16
This comment will first examine the history behind naturalization
procedures in the U.S. Second, this comment will analyze the conflicting
10. NPR, supra note 1.
11. After Years of Delay, Lawsuits Jumpstart Path to US Citizenship, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 25, 2007, at 1.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
13. See, e.g., Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) petitions); U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d
1144, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (finding that the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over pending naturalization applications after 120 days of the applicant’s examination).
14. See, e.g., Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding
that the district courts and immigration agencies have concurrent jurisdiction over 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b) petitions).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).
16. See, e.g., Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, 581 F. Supp. 2d 243, 246 (D. Mass. 2008)
(denying USCIS’s motion for remand); Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (E.D. Va.
2007) (remanding the naturalization application to USCIS with instructions on how to proceed on
the application).
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opinions among the courts as to whether 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides the
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization
applications or whether the district courts and USCIS share jurisdiction over
§ 1447(b) actions. Additionally, where courts have retained jurisdiction, this
comment will address different court decisions to either remand the matter
back to USCIS or adjudicate the application. Finally, this comment will
conclude with the author’s analysis that courts should retain exclusive
jurisdiction and determine the applications on their merits.
II. THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS
A.

The Naturalization Process Prior to the Homeland Security Act

The U.S. federal government has not always controlled naturalization
proceedings and immigration regulations.17 When the American Revolution
ended in 1783, just years after the colonies declared their independence, the
federal government left naturalization matters to the states.18 It was not until
1790 when Congress took naturalization matters into its own hands.19 Under
the 1790 Act, free, adult, white individuals who had resided in the U.S. for at
least two years were eligible for U.S. citizenship.20 In order to obtain
citizenship, a petitioner had to file a naturalization application with a state or
federal court in the state where the petitioner resided.21 Despite small
legislative alterations to naturalization requirements throughout the following
century, the basic framework under the 1790 Act applied: petitioners were to
bring their naturalization applications to a court in their state of residence.22
Agencies first made their mark on immigration matters in the Immigration
Act of 1891.23 Under the supervision of the Treasury Department, the Bureau
of Immigration was established to regulate immigration laws.24 However, the

17. WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 2 (2008), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/OpportunityExclusion11-25-08.pdf.
18. Id. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY:
LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, at 1, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/
Legislation%20from%201790%20-%201900.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900].
19. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch.
20, § 4, 1 Stat. 414, 415.
20. § 1, 1 Stat. at 103. See also EWING, supra note 17, at 2; EILLEEN BOLGER, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN REG’L NAT’L ARCHIVES & REC. ADMIN., BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES NATURALIZATION PROCESS (2003), http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/nat
info.htm.
21. § 1, 1 Stat. at 103. See also BOLGER, supra note 20.
22. Nancy Morawetz, Citizenship and the Courts, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 451 (2007).
23. LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, supra note 18, at 4. See also Immigration Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.
24. LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, supra note 18, at 4. See also § 7, 26 Stat. at 1085.
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Bureau did not stay in the Treasury Department’s hands for long. In 1903, the
Bureau was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor, where a
commissioner was granted control over enforcing immigration laws.25
Naturalization matters were later transferred to the Department of Commerce
and Labor in the Naturalization Act of 1906, and the Bureau of Immigration
became the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.26 Not only did the
1906 Naturalization Act combine both immigration and naturalization matters
into one agency, but the Act also added more requirements to become a
naturalized citizen, such as the ability to understand English.27
In 1933, the Bureau’s name was changed to the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) by executive order.28 Although the INS was an
agency under the Department of Labor and Commerce, 29 the Department of
Justice played a predominant role in enforcing immigration laws.30 Thus, in
1940, for security purposes, the Department of Justice took over the INS.31
However, despite the INS taking over immigration and naturalization matters,
the INS was not equipped to award citizenship.32 This power was still left to
the courts.33
An important advancement in U.S. immigration and naturalization policy
occurred in the 20th century. Prior to 1952, not all races were entitled to
become U.S. citizens.34 However, in 1952, Congress took a big leap in
reforming its naturalization laws by allowing all races to apply for

25. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY:
LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, at 1, http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Legislation%
20from%201901-1940.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940]. See also Act of Feb. 14,
1903, ch. 552, § 4, 32 Stat. 825, 826–27.
26. LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, supra note 25, at 1. See also Naturalization Act of June
29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 1, 34 Stat. 596.
27. LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, supra note 25, at 1. See also § 8, 34 Stat. at 599.
28. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service–
Populating a Nation: A History of Immigration and Naturalization, Sept. 10, 2008,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/legacy/ins_history.xml [hereinafter CBP].
29. § 4, 32 Stat. at 826.
30. BOLGER, supra note 20.
31. LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, supra note 25, at 6. See also Act of June 4, 1940, ch.
231, § 3, 54 Stat. 230, 231; BOLGER, supra note 20; CBP, supra note 28 (noting that the
Immigration and Naturalization Bureau become the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
1933).
32. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795,
ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 414, 415 (Act only allowing white adults to become citizens); Act of July 14,
1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (Act allowing immigrants of African descent to naturalize);
Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, § 1, 60 Stat. 416 (Act authorizing naturalization of individuals from
India and the Philippine Islands).
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naturalization in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).35 Not
only did the INA make major changes to U.S. naturalization policy, but it also
integrated all other immigration statutes into the INA and codified existing
immigration and naturalization provisions.36 Today the INA is still the
primary source of immigration law.37
Although the courts retained exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization
adjudications, federal agencies continued to play a key function in the
naturalization process. In the 1980s, naturalization applicants were required to
submit an application to a naturalization court.38 After submitting the
application, an INS employee administered an examination,39 and would
submit a recommendation to the court to grant or deny citizenship to the
applicant.40 Generally, courts would follow the recommendations of the INS
employee in either granting or denying citizenship.41
In the 1980s, there were a number of concerns regarding naturalization
delays caused by backlogs in the courts’ dockets.42 Prior to the enactment of
the Immigration Act of 1990, this concern was reflected in a House Report,
which stated, “Fully qualified applicants must wait two years in some places to
be sworn in as a U.S. citizen. This, of course, affects employment
opportunities, travel plans, and . . . most importantly, deprives these
individuals of their right to vote.”43 Another concern in the House Report
included indetermination on the part of naturalization examiners, which helped
support the fact that applicants should still be able to utilize the court system.44
As seen in the House Report, “Congress sought to achieve two major goals: to
‘streamline’ the process of acquiring citizenship so as to solve the problem of
unnecessary delays, and to preserve full recourse to the courts.”45
The courts’ basic power to grant naturalization applications, for the most
part, ended with an amendment to the INA in 1990, known as the Immigration

35. Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 2, §
311, 66 Stat. 239 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (2006)).
36. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoi
d=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=f3829c7755cb9010Vgn
VCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.
37. Id.
38. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1988).
39. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988).
40. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452–53. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(c).
41. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 453. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 10 (1989).
42. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 453–54.
43. Id. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8 (1989).
44. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 12, 14.
45. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8, 14.
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Act of 1990.46 The Immigration Act of 1990 gave the Attorney General
exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization adjudications,47 which, for the first
time, granted an agency the power to grant or deny naturalization
applications.48 Instead of the courts giving their final stamp of approval on
naturalization applications, the INS was given the authority to grant citizenship
through the Attorney General.49 Thus, the Immigration Act of 1990 ended the
courts’ 200-year reign over adjudicating naturalization applications.
B.

Current Naturalization Procedures

After the deadly attacks of 9/11, the U.S. once again saw a change in
immigration and naturalization policies.
The Homeland Security Act
abolished the INS in 2002,50 and the newly created Department of Homeland
Security took over the INS tasks.51 INS’s former functions were separated into
three branches: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
Information and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border
Among other functions, USCIS took charge of
Protection (CBP).52
naturalization applications and adjudications.53
Now, an individual wishing to obtain U.S. citizenship must file a
naturalization application with USCIS.54 Generally, in order to become a
naturalized citizen, the applicant must know the English language, be familiar
with U.S. history and government,55 and be at least 18 years of age.56
Furthermore, an applicant must have resided in the U.S. for at least 5 years as a
permanent resident before he or she may become a naturalized citizen.57
After a naturalization application has been submitted, USCIS conducts an
investigation to determine if the applicant is fit for U.S. citizenship.58 At a

46. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV.,
IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY: LEGISLATION FROM 1981–1996, at 3–4, http://www.uscis.gov/
files/nativedocuments/Legislation%20from%201981-1996.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATION FROM
1981–1996].
47. LEGISLATION FROM 1981–1996, supra note 46, at 3–4. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
48. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454.
49. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
50. 6 U.S.C. § 291(a) (Supp. 2002).
51. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101). See also Lauren E. Sasser, Waiting in Immigration
Limbo: The Federal Court Split Over Suits to Compel Action on Stalled Adjustment of Status
Applications, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 2514 (2008).
52. Sasser, supra note 51, at 2514.
53. Id.
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (2006).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (2006).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(b).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006).
58. 8 C.F.R. § 335.1 (2009). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006).
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minimum, the investigation must include “a review of all pertinent records,
police department checks, and a neighborhood investigation . . . .”59
Additionally, a criminal background check must be performed under the
supervision of the FBI, and only after there has been a definitive response from
the FBI on the criminal background check will an applicant be able to appear
before USCIS for his or her initial examination.60 The initial examination
consists of a question-and-answer series administered under oath by a USCIS
officer.61 So long as the applicant meets all statutory requirements, USCIS
must grant the applicant’s naturalization application.62
Although from the outset USCIS has the power to determine who may
become a naturalized citizen, the court system still has some power in
naturalization proceedings. Congress has given courts the power to review
USCIS’s denial of a naturalization application.63 If USCIS denies an
application for naturalization, the applicant has the option to request a hearing
before an immigration officer to appeal USCIS’s decision.64 It is only after the
applicant has received a decision on his or her appeal that the applicant may go
to court to request a review on his or her citizenship denial.65
Furthermore, the courts have the power to determine naturalization
applications when there is a delay at the agency level.66 Under 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b), a naturalization applicant may petition a district court for a hearing on
his or her naturalization application if USCIS delays on making a decision on
the application.67 The applicant may only bring a § 1447(b) action after 120
days of his or her naturalization examination.68 The “examination” has
generally been held to mean the applicant’s initial interview with USCIS.69
Thus, once the applicant’s initial interview with USCIS takes place, the “120day clock” begins to tick for the applicant to bring a § 1447(b) suit.70
According to USCIS’s own regulation, a full criminal background check
must be completed before the initial examination.71 The full criminal
background check includes investigative results of criminal and administrative
59. 8 C.F.R. § 335.1.
60. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2009). In the past, USCIS conducted initial interviews before
proceeding with the FBI background checks; now, USCIS completes the FBI background checks
before administering initial interviews. See 2008 OMBUDSMAN REPORT, supra note 7 at 5–7.
61. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(c).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) (2009).
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (2006).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D. Va. 2007).
70. See id.
71. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2006).
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records, as well as fingerprint checks.72 In the past, name checks were not
included in the criminal background check.73 Therefore, an individual’s initial
examination could take place before the completion of the name check but
only after the criminal background check. However, in 2006, USCIS changed
its policy and now requires that the name check be complete before the initial
examination.74 Thus, now, the 120-day clock does not start ticking until both
the name check and the initial interview are complete. Despite this change in
policy, there are still individuals who have completed their initial interviews
but are still waiting for clearance on their name checks, for these individuals
applied for naturalization prior to the policy change.75 Furthermore, the new
policy is relevant because it can deter § 1447(b) suits, and the applicants will
more than likely have long wait times before hearing a response from USCIS.76
By allowing the courts to maintain some power in the naturalization process,
and at the same time, giving an agency the power to adjudicate naturalization
petitions, there has been “considerable confusion in sorting through the proper
role for the courts in naturalization cases.”77
III. DETERMINING WHETHER 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B) VESTS THE COURTS WITH
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OR CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH USCIS
After an applicant has waited more than 120 days from his or her
naturalization examination and has heard no response from USCIS, many
applicants bring suit against the government in a U.S. district court by utilizing
§ 1447(b).78 However, the courts have conflicted in determining what
authority they actually have under this statute.79 Some courts have held that
the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the pending application.80
Under this interpretation, regardless whether USCIS makes a determination on
an application during a pending § 1447(b) action, the courts will reject
72. Id.
73. See Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Acting Assoc. Dir. of Domestic Operations,
USCIS, Background Checks and Naturalization Interview Scheduling (Apr. 25, 2006),
http://www.ailf.org/lac/uscismemo060425.pdf [hereinafter Memo on Background Checks].
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Janko v. Chertoff, No. 3:08-CV-145, 2009 WL 102961, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan.
15, 2009) (naturalization applicant brought § 1447(b) action after the name-check policy change,
but at the time he applied for naturalization, his initial interview was completed before the results
of the name check); Semreen v. USCIS, No. 8:07-cv-1941-T-33TGW, 2008 WL 5381908, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2008) (same).
76. NPR, supra note 1.
77. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 456.
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
79. See, e.g., Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359
F.3d 1144, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
80. See, e.g., Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164; Etape, 497 F.3d at 381.
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USCIS’s determination and either remand the case back to USCIS with
instructions on how to proceed with the application or decide whether the
applicant should be awarded citizenship.81 However, other courts have held
that § 1447(b) provides the courts and USCIS with concurrent jurisdiction over
the matter.82 Therefore, under this scenario, if USCIS makes a determination
on an application during a § 1447(b) action, the court will consider the case
moot and dismiss the action.83 Thus, there is a lack of consistency among the
courts in terms of what role they actually play in § 1447(b) actions.
A.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

Only a few appellate courts have decided whether § 1447(b) vests the
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction prior to 2009.84 The Ninth Circuit in
U.S. v. Hovsepian determined in 2004 that § 1447(b) does in fact give the
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications.85
In 2007, the Fourth Circuit in Etape v. Chertoff, relying heavily on Hovsepian,
came to the same conclusion.86
1. U.S. v. Hovsepian
Hovsepian was the first federal appellate court to determine whether §
1447(b) vests the district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending
naturalization applications.87 In determining that § 1447(b) grants the courts
with exclusive jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit looked at the law’s text, the
statutory context, and congressional policy objectives.88
In viewing the statutory text of § 1447(b), the Ninth Circuit noted several
reasons why it grants the courts exclusive jurisdiction.89 First, the Ninth
Circuit found that a concurrent jurisdiction interpretation of § 1447(b) would
be inconsistent with the entire language of the statute.90 Because § 1447(b)
states that the district courts “may either determine the matter or remand the
matter, with appropriate instructions, to [USCIS] to determine the matter,”91
and because the statute expressly gives the courts, and only the courts, the
option to either remand the case to USCIS or determine the application for

81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).
82. See, e.g., Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
83. See id.
84. See Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2009); Etape, 497 F.3d at
381–82, 388; Hovsepian, 359 F.2d at 1152, 1159, 1164.
85. Hovsepian, 359 F.2d at 1164.
86. Etape, 497 F.3d at 388.
87. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1159, 1164.
88. Id. at 1159–64.
89. Id. 1160–61.
90. Id. at 1160.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
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itself,92 the Ninth Circuit determined that Congress intended for the courts to
have exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover the Ninth Circuit found that the courts
could not necessarily determine the matter if USCIS could also determine the
outcome of the application, which would be the case under a concurrent
jurisdiction scheme.93
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit looked at the “remand” language in §
1447(b).94 According to the Ninth Circuit, if in fact USCIS had concurrent
jurisdiction during a § 1447(b) action, there would be no reason for Congress
to place the word “remand” in the statute because USCIS would have the
power to decide the application all along.95 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted
that when a typical case is remanded to a district court, it is remanded because
the district court lost jurisdiction over the matter.96 In essence, remand
provides for a hierarchy, where a higher body of law can send a case back to a
lower body of law.97 However, under a concurrent-jurisdiction interpretation,
the court could not “remand the case,” in the typical sense, if in fact USCIS
retained the same jurisdiction as the court throughout the § 1447(b) action.98
Moreover, if USCIS had the power to make a determination on the application
all along, then the word “remand” in the statute would be meaningless.99 The
Ninth Circuit stated that it could not interpret the statute in such as manner that
would render a portion of it meaningless.100
The Ninth Circuit found further support for its statutory interpretation of §
1447(b) in Brock v. Pierce County.101 In Brock, the Supreme Court “held that
an agency does not lose jurisdiction unless the statute at issue requires that the
agency act within a particular time period and the statute specifies a
consequence for failure to comply with the time limit.”102 According to
Hovsepian, § 1447(b) requires that USCIS act within a particular time frame of
120 days from the applicant’s initial interview and specifies a consequence for
USCIS’s failure to act within the 120 days by handing over jurisdiction to the
courts.103 Hence, applying Brock, the Ninth Circuit concluded that USCIS
loses jurisdiction after 120 days.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1161.
Id. See also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 259 (1986).
Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1161.
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The Ninth Circuit also looked to the statutory context of § 1447(b) to
determine that the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over pending
naturalization applications.104 When interpreting the meaning of the statute,
the Ninth Circuit noted that it must “consider Congress’ words in the context
of the overall statutory scheme.”105 Thus, the court looked to another statute in
the same sub-chapter as § 1447(b).106 That statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c),
provides that a district court can review a naturalization application de novo if
USCIS denied the application, and the applicant has exhausted all appeals at
the agency level.107 Because district courts are allowed to determine
naturalization applications in § 1447(b) actions just like courts in § 1421(c)
hearings, the Ninth Circuit found, based on a consistent statutory-context
interpretation, that the courts retain the final word in § 1447(b) suits just as the
courts retain the final word in § 1421(c) hearings.108 Thus, by having the final
word, the courts retain exclusive jurisdiction in § 1447(b) suits.109
Hovsepian went on to explain congressional policy objectives when
Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1990.110 Congress’s four main
objectives, according to the Ninth Circuit, were “to reduce the waiting time for
naturalization applicants,” to “streamline the process of applying for
naturalization and . . . to reduce the burdens on courts and [USCIS],” to
maintain “consistency and fairness of naturalization decisions,” and “to give
naturalization applicants the power to choose which forum [to] adjudicate their
applications.”111
If Congress’s purpose in enacting the Immigration Act of 1990 was to
reduce the waiting time for applicants applying for naturalization, Congress’s
purpose would be undermined if the courts maintained that the statute allowed
for concurrent jurisdiction, according to Hovsepian.112 Congress’s purpose
would be undermined because USCIS would have no incentive to make a
determination on an application within the 120-day time frame if it could
simply make a determination during a pending § 1447(b) action in the district
court.113 Therefore, nothing would really change for USCIS once a § 1447(b)
action started because the agency would have the same power that it had prior
to the start of the § 1447(b) action.114 Thus, if the courts determined that 8

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. n.14 (citing A-Z Int’l v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 1161–62.
8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006).
Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1163–64.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1163.
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U.S.C. § 1447(b) mandated concurrent jurisdiction, “Congress’ intent to
require [USCIS] to make a determination within 120 days of an applicant’s
examination” would be frustrated.115
The Ninth Circuit also addressed Congress’s intention to streamline the
naturalization process in enacting the Immigration Act of 1990.116 By
allowing both USCIS and the courts to maintain concurrent jurisdiction, the
end result would “lead to a waste of time and resources because district courts
and [USCIS] would often engage in unnecessary duplication of factual
investigations and legal analyses.”117 Furthermore, allowing USCIS to
maintain jurisdiction would waste resources if USCIS made a determination on
a naturalization application during a pending § 1447(b) action.118 According to
the court, if USCIS denied the application during a pending action under a
concurrent-jurisdiction scheme, the courts would have to dismiss the case, and
the applicant would have to exhaust all administrative hearings before bringing
his case back to the court.119 Unless the applicant moved to a different district,
more than likely the same court would end up reviewing the same
naturalization application that was brought during the § 1447(b) action.120
Undoubtedly, this process would be duplicative and clog up the court system’s
resources.121 Therefore, if courts were to hold that § 1447(b) allows for
concurrent jurisdiction, the courts and USCIS would be overly burdened,
which would frustrate Congress’s intention of streamlining the naturalization
process.122
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that if § 1447(b) vests both USCIS and
the courts with jurisdiction, there would be a race to determine the result of a
naturalization application, which would frustrate the drafters’ concerns of
consistency and fairness in naturalization determinations.123 When there is a
disagreement between USCIS and a district court as to whether a naturalization
application should be granted, the first to decide on the application would
ultimately prevail if both the courts and USCIS had jurisdiction.124 According
to the Ninth Circuit, there would be a rush to the finish line to make a decision
on the applications by both the courts and USCIS, which would lead to
mistakes in reviewing the application.125 In the eyes of the applicant, when
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120.
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122.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1163–64.
See id.
Id. at 1164.
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there is a rush to determine the merits of a naturalization application, the
legitimacy of the process is diminished.126 This would not stay true to the
congressional objective of fairness in the process.127 Moreover, as noted by
the Ninth Circuit, a finding that § 1447(b) gives courts exclusive jurisdiction
advances the consistency of the process because courts would have the last
word on both delayed applications in § 1447(b) actions, as well as on
application denials per § 1421(c).128 Therefore, by concluding that § 1447(b)
provides courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending applications, the
process of reviewing delayed applications would be consistent with the process
of reviewing denied applications, which, according to the Ninth Circuit, would
ultimately be fairer to the applicant.129
In looking at the fourth and final congressional objective, that Congress
intended for applicants to choose the forum to adjudicate their naturalization
applications, the court found further support for its holding that § 1447(b)
provides courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization
applications.130 In the words of Congressman Morrison, “it is the applicant,
not the government, who decides the place and setting and the timeframe in
which the application will be processed.”131 Thus, by finding that § 1447(b)
provides for concurrent jurisdiction, the applicant would be stripped of a
judicial determination if USCIS elected to make a decision on the
naturalization application during the pending action.132 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit found further support for its finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides
the courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications.
2. Etape v. Chertoff
Three years after the Hovsepian decision, the Fourth Circuit, in Etape,
determined whether or not 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) vests the district courts with
exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applicants.133 The Fourth
Circuit relied heavily upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision to determine that §
1447(b) does in fact vest the district courts with exclusive jurisdiction.134
However, the Fourth Circuit also came up with some further points to bolster
the exclusive jurisdiction holding.

126. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 16,995 (1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison) (emphasis
added)).
132. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164.
133. Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2007).
134. See id. at 383–84.
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The Fourth Circuit stated that by allowing USCIS to maintain concurrent
jurisdiction under § 1447(b), the court would be stripped of its power to
determine the matter or remand the issue back to USCIS if USCIS made a
decision on a naturalization application during a pending § 1447(b) action.135
Essentially, by allowing USCIS to make a determination on an application
during a pending action, the courts would be divested of their jurisdictional
power.136 According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress’s intent was not to divest
the courts’ jurisdictional power by allowing USCIS to essentially take over a
pending matter.137
The Fourth Circuit also expanded upon some of the congressional policy
conclusions made by the Ninth Circuit in Hovsepian. The Fourth Circuit noted
that most of USCIS’s investigatory functions take place before the applicant’s
initial examination and that the 120-day clock does not start ticking until well
after USCIS has already made some of its findings.138 For example, FBI
fingerprint checks are generally completed in a few days and, in some cases,
even minutes.139 Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, USCIS’s
expertise, which Congress intended to employ in the statute, would not be
undermined by giving the district courts exclusive jurisdiction, as a majority of
USCIS’s investigations, including some background checks, take place well
before a petitioner can even bring a § 1447(b) action.140 Putting worries to rest
that courts do not have the resources to conduct investigations and that
allowing courts to conduct investigations will “strain[] judicial resources,”141
the court concluded that Congress had faith in allowing the courts to conduct
de novo reviews of naturalization applications, and judicial resources would
not be strained if the court chose the option of sending the case back to
USCIS.142 Thus, the Fourth Circuit strengthened the conclusion that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1447(b) provides courts with exclusive jurisdiction as opposed to jurisdiction
shared by the courts and USCIS.
B.

Concurrent Jurisdiction

Although many courts have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides courts
with exclusive jurisdiction over pending applications,143 some courts have

135. Id.
136. Id. at 383.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 386.
139. 2008 OMBUDSMAN REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
140. Etape, 497 F.3d at 386.
141. See id. at 394 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 387.
143. See id. at 383; United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.2d 1144, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc); Zaranska v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 400 F.Supp.2d 500, 505 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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concluded otherwise.144 Although overruled in 2009,145 Bustamante v.
Chertoff provides an example of the reasoning behind those courts in other
circuits that find that § 1447(b) provides both the courts and USCIS with
jurisdiction over applications.146 In Bustamante, the plaintiff filed a complaint
pursuant to § 1447(b) after receiving no response from USCIS after 120 days
from taking his naturalization examination.147 While the action was pending in
the district court, USCIS denied the plaintiff’s application.148 Although the
district court acknowledged that the majority of courts have found that §
1447(b) vests the courts with exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization
applications,149 the district court went against the grain and determined that §
1447(b) does not divest USCIS of its jurisdiction over the matter.150
In Bustamante, the court looked at the statute’s plain language151 and
legislative history,152 and found that the Supreme Court also supported
concurrent jurisdiction.153 The district court determined that the plain language
of § 1447(b) does not divest the agency of jurisdiction in an action involving a
pending naturalization application.154 By looking at other statutes passed by
Congress,155 the district court inferred that the absence of the word “exclusive”
in § 1447(b) allows the agency to retain jurisdiction over pending
naturalization applications.156 The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s
argument that the words “determine” and “remand” in the statute grant the
courts exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications.157 As
stated under § 1447(b), when a plaintiff brings an action in a district court for a
delinquent decision on the part of USCIS, the court can determine whether to

144. See Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F.Supp.2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that 8
U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides for concurrent jurisdiction among the courts and USCIS); Perry v.
Gonzales, 472 F.Supp.2d 623, 630 (D.N.J. 2007); Al-Saleh v. Gonzales, No. 2:06-CV-00604 TC,
2007 WL 990145, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2007).
145. See Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2009).
146. Bustamante, 533 F.Supp.2d at 381.
147. Id. at 374.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 376.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
153. Id. at 380.
154. Id. at 376.
155. Id. (reviewing statutes, such as 5 U.S.C. § 8477 (2006), 6 U.S.C. § 442 (2006), 7 U.S.C.
§ 2279 (2000), 7 U.S.C. § 2279 (2000 & Supp. II 2002), 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000 & Supp. V 2005),
where the words “exclusive jurisdiction” were specifically stated when district courts were
granted exclusive jurisdiction over actions).
156. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
157. Id.
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remand the case to USCIS or it can adjudicate the application.158 However,
according to the court, the word “remand” in the statute does not mean that the
courts are given exclusive jurisdiction in a pending application proceeding.159
Instead, the court determined that the word “remand” only gives a court the
option to remand the application back to USCIS or to adjudicate the
application if USCIS had not acted on a pending naturalization application
during a § 1447(b) action.160
The court in Bustamante refuted both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’
conclusions that the courts would lose their power if § 1447(b) bestowed
USCIS with jurisdiction.161 Bustamante came to the opposite conclusion,
finding that it was not the courts but rather USCIS that would lose its power
under a concurrent-jurisdiction scheme.162 According to Bustamante, if both
USCIS and the courts had jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications,
obviously either the court or USCIS would come to a determination on the
application first.163 If a court made a decision to grant or deny an application
before USCIS, USCIS would have to take the court’s decision on the
application without objection.164 However, if USCIS came to a determination
first and denied a pending naturalization application, the courts would still be
able to have a final say on appeal.165 In such a situation, the courts would still
have jurisdiction over the matter to determine if the application was improperly
denied and would have the power to reverse the findings of USCIS.166
Furthermore, the court concluded that when an application is denied or
granted by USCIS during a § 1447(b) action, USCIS itself does not divest the
court of its jurisdictional power under a concurrent jurisdiction
interpretation.167 Rather, the court stated that the Constitution divests the court
of its power.168 When USCIS grants or denies an application during a pending
action, the controversy becomes moot, according to the court.169 In such a

158. Id. at 378; 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
159. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 377.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 377. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006).
166. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 377. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (2006) (“If, after an
examination under section 1446 of this title, an application for naturalization is denied, the
applicant may request a hearing before an immigration officer.”).
167. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
168. Id.
169. See id.
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situation, the court stated that the Constitution would forbid the action from
going any further—not USCIS.170
The court in Bustamante also considered Congress’s intent and found
further support that § 1447(b) does not vest the courts with exclusive
jurisdiction.171 The court believed that the Ninth and Fourth Circuits were
wrong in deciding that exclusive jurisdiction best served Congress’s intent of
speeding up the naturalization process, concluding that, instead, the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits’ interpretation would actually slow down the naturalization
process.172 According to the court, “the filing of a § 1447(b) action prods
[US]CIS into making a decision.”173 When an applicant is either granted or
denied his citizenship during a pending action, the court noted that USCIS
usually acts within 60 days of the action being filed, before a Rule 16
conference can be held.174 If concurrent jurisdiction was not the intent of
Congress in enacting § 1447(b), speedy resolutions would be hard to come by
because in many instances, district courts remand the case back to the agency
instead of determining the application on the merits.175 In such a situation, if
the applicant is denied citizenship, the applicant must exhaust administrative
appeals before bringing his action back into the court for further review.176
The court again looked to Hovsepian and refuted some of the conclusions
made by the Ninth Circuit.177 First, the court did not find that applicants would
have to wait longer if USCIS had jurisdiction over the application.178 Under a
concurrent-jurisdiction interpretation, according to Hovsepian, the applicant
would have to exhaust all administrative appeals before bringing his or her
170. See id. (citing to Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 394 (4th Cir. 2007) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting)). See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority . . . to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to
controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state;
between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
states, citizens or subjects.
171. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
172. Id. See also United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc);
Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 386 (4th Cir. 2007).
173. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (2006) (“If, after an examination [of the naturalization
applicant], an application for naturalization is denied, the applicant may request a hearing before
an immigration officer.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006) (“A person whose application for
naturalization . . . is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of
this Title, may seek review of such denial before the United States district court . . . .”).
177. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
178. Id.
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case back into the district court if USCIS denied the application during the
§ 1447(b) action.179 The court found two problems with Hovsepian’s
conclusion: the Ninth Circuit assumed that USCIS denies most applications in
pending lawsuits and that district courts actually decide the applications on the
merits.180 The court stated that it had never been proven that USCIS primarily
denies applications.181 Therefore, if the courts had concurrent jurisdiction and
USCIS grants an application during a pending action, the naturalization
process would actually be sped up.182 Furthermore, the court stated that since a
district court cannot be forced to make a decision on the merits of a pending
naturalization application, it is unlikely that the courts will actually determine
the merits of the application due to busy dockets.183 Thus, with the high
probability that courts will remand the application back to USCIS, an incentive
is given to USCIS to quickly determine the naturalization application in the
pending transaction.184 Therefore, the court in Bustamante determined that §
1447(b) did not divest USCIS of its jurisdiction because it would undermine
the legislative intent in enacting the statute.185
Finally, Bustamante relied heavily on the Supreme Court decision in
Brock,186 just as the court in Hovsepian relied on Brock to support its
conclusion that § 1447(b) provides exclusive jurisdiction over pending
applications.187 The court in Bustamante concluded that nothing in § 1447(b)’s
statutory text requires USCIS to make a determination within 120 days on a
naturalization application, unlike the case in Brock where the statutory
language required the agency to make a determination within 120 days.188
Furthermore, looking at the Court’s ruling in Brock, the court drew the
conclusion that § 1447(b) does not “specify a consequence” requiring a
divestment of USCIS’s jurisdiction.189 According to the court, all § 1447(b)
does is give the applicant an option to bring an action to court in the event that
the applicant has not received a timely decision on his or her naturalization
application, which does not mean that USCIS is automatically divested of its
jurisdictional power.190 Thus, the court found that its reasoning fell inline with

179.
banc).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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187.
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189.
190.

Id. See also United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 384 (4th Cir. 2007).
Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
Id. at 381.
Id.
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the decision in Brock because there was no clear, unequivocal language in §
1447(b) showing Congress’s intent to strip USCIS of its jurisdictional
power.191 Therefore, the court in Bustamante concluded that 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b) provides for concurrent jurisdiction between USCIS and the courts.192
IV. REMAND OR DECIDE?
In the event that a court retains jurisdiction over a § 1447(b) action, it must
decide whether to remand the case to USCIS or to grant or deny the applicant
citizenship itself.193 However, just like the courts conflict on whether §
1447(b) provides the courts with exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, the
courts have come to different conclusions on whether to remand the case to
USCIS or to grant or deny the naturalization application.194
A.

Remand

A majority of courts have decided to remand the application to USCIS
with instructions rather than adjudicate the matter.195 Primarily, courts have
come to this conclusion when dealing with situations where the FBI
background checks have not been fully completed.196 In such situations,
USCIS has no authority to determine an application until the FBI has
completed the background check.197
In Manzoor v. Chertoff, the court remanded the case with instructions to
USCIS rather than determine the petitioner’s qualifications for
naturalization.198 In that case, not all of the plaintiff’s background checks had
been completed at the time the plaintiff initiated the action.199 The court
decided to remand the case after looking at a number of factors.200 Looking

191. Id.
192. Id. at 376.
193. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
194. See Manzoor v. Chertoff, 473 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (E.D. Va. 2007) (remanding the
pending naturalization application back to USCIS); Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, 581 F. Supp. 2d
243, 246 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying USCIS’s motion to remand a pending naturalization
application in a § 1447(b) suit).
195. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
196. See, e.g., id.; El-Daour v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Shalabi v.
Gonzales, No. 4:06CV866 RWS, 2006 WL 3032413, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 23, 2006).
197. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 809; 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006) (“Before a person may be
naturalized, an employee of [USCIS] . . . shall conduct a personal examination of the person
applying for naturalization . . . .”). See also 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2008) (“Completion of
background checks before examination. [USCIS] will notify applicants for naturalization to
appear . . . for initial examination on the naturalization application only after [USCIS] has
received a definitive response from the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
198. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
199. Id. at 803.
200. Id. at 808–09.
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first to background checks, the court in Manzoor came to the conclusion that
the courts could not analyze background checks on applicants in the same
manner as USCIS, and furthermore, in many cases, USCIS must ask follow-up
questions to determine the applicant’s qualifications for naturalization.201
Since the FBI conducts the background checks, and USCIS analyzes the results
of the background checks, the court found USCIS was in the better position to
interpret and follow up on background checks than the courts.202
The court also decided to remand the case to USCIS due to its finding that
the 120-day time frame in § 1447(b) was to accelerate the naturalization
process rather to impede it.203 At the time the case was decided, it was
USCIS’s policy to complete the initial examination before completing name
checks.204 The court concluded that if it were to decide the case for itself, the
courts would “discourage [US]CIS from continuing its practice of scheduling
interviews prior to the completion of the FBI background checks.”205 The
court hinted that if it were to grant or deny the petitioner citizenship, it would
encourage USCIS to complete all background checks, including the name
check, before the initial interview.206 Thus, the 120-day time frame would not
kick in until after USCIS had completed the initial interview – which would
occur after the name check – and impede the acceleration process.207
Additionally, because USCIS was simply waiting for a response from the FBI
(which it needed in order to adjudicate the naturalization application), the court
thought it only fair to hand the case back over to USCIS, since the agency had
no authority in the first place to adjudicate the application.208
Manzoor also noted that “nothing in § 1447(b) mandates that USCIS make
a decision within 120 days of the initial interview” because all the statute says
is that an applicant has the option to go to court to compel action on the
application.209 Also, the court found that USCIS does not necessarily even
have authority to grant or deny a naturalization application before or after 120
days of the initial interview due to the fact that USCIS cannot make a
determination on a naturalization application until after all background checks
are complete.210 Therefore, the court determined that if USCIS’s delay is due

201. Id. at 808.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 808. See also Memo on Background Check, supra note
74.
205. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
206. See id. at 808–09.
207. See id. at 809.
208. See id.
209. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
210. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 809. See Fingerprinting Applicants and Petitioners for
Immigration Benefits; Establishing a Fee for Fingerprinting by the Service; Requiring
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to the FBI’s failure to complete a background check, the court should remand
the case back to USCIS.211
Finally, in coming to its conclusion to remand the case to USCIS, the court
in Manzoor stated that it did not want applicants to use the court system as a
way of expediting their naturalization applications by filing lawsuits with the
district courts, as it was not Congress’s intent in enacting § 1447(b) to provide
individuals with a way to expedite the naturalization process.212 According to
the district court, when applicants file such lawsuits, the lawsuit distracts
USCIS and eats away at the agency’s resources.213 By remanding the case to
USCIS with instructions to make a decision, the court stated that this would
prevent applicants from “jump[ing] to the front of the line” to get
determinations on their naturalization applications.214 Rather, courts should
determine the case for themselves only in rare instances where both the
background checks and initial interview have already been completed, which
shows an unnecessary delay on the part of USCIS.215
B.

Adjudicating the Application

Only a handful of courts have decided to adjudicate a naturalization
application rather than to remand the application to USCIS.216 In
Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, the court denied USCIS’s motion to remand the
application to USCIS and, instead, opted to hold a hearing on the merits.217
While the court noted that a majority of courts dealing with § 1447(b) hearings
generally remand, the court also noted that such decisions to remand generally
occur when the FBI had failed to complete an essential background check or
there were other security concerns at hand.218 Because the government had not
established that any background checks on the plaintiff were pending and the
plaintiff had waited for over two years for a decision on the application, the
court in Taalebinezhaad decided that it should not remand given the

Completion of Criminal Background Checks Before Final Adjudication of Naturalization
Applications, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,979, 12981 (Mar. 17, 1998) (USCIS “must receive confirmation
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that a full criminal background check has been
completed on applicants for naturalizations before final adjudication of the application”).
211. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, 581 F. Supp. 2d 243, 245 (D. Mass. 2008); Omran
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. et al., No. 1:07-cv-187, 2008 WL 320295, at *3, *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4,
2008); Shalan v. Chertoff, No. Civ.A. 05-10980-RWZ, 2006 WL 42143, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 6,
2006).
217. Taalebinezhaad, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
218. Id. at 245.
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circumstances of the case.219 The court decided it would take matters into its
own hands due to USCIS’s failure to provide the plaintiff with a timely
response when USCIS had all of the background check results.220
Furthermore, the court stated that USCIS could present findings to the court to
help the court come to a conclusion on the application, which countered the
argument that USCIS is better equipped to make decisions on naturalization
applications.221
However, in Attisha v. Jenifer, the court refused to remand the case to
USCIS despite the fact that the FBI name check had not yet been completed.222
Due to the fact that almost two and a half years had passed since a request for a
name check had been made, the court stated that the delay was
inappropriate.223 While recognizing that completing mandatory background
checks is an important function of USCIS, the court stated that remanding the
case in no way would expedite the plaintiff’s background check, given the fact
that USCIS could not guarantee that a decision on the application could be
rendered by a specific time.224 By interpreting that § 1447(b) was enacted in
part to ensure that USCIS does not unreasonably delay determinations on
naturalization applications, the court found it proper to take over the action and
to determine the merits of the application for itself.225
V. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: TAKING OVER THE ACTION AND DETERMINING THE
APPLICATION ONCE AND FOR ALL
A.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

For many reasons, courts should find that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) vests the
court with exclusive jurisdiction. From § 1447(b)’s statutory text to the
congressional intent of enacting § 1447(b), concurrent jurisdiction with USCIS
would frustrate the goals of Congress in implementing the statute.
By looking at the cases discussed, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits arguably
make better points that the courts should retain exclusive jurisdiction over
pending naturalization applications, as opposed to the court in Bustamante,
which found that § 1447(b) grants both the courts and USCIS with jurisdiction.
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ strongest points came from their statutory-text
interpretations, as well as the fact that Congress intended to speed up the

219.
220.
221.
222.
2007).
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. (citing Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2007)).
Attisha v. Jenifer, No. 07-CV-10345, 2007 WL 2637772, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6,
Id.
Id.
Id.
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naturalization process in enacting the Immigration Act of 1990. Because the
text of the statute expressly states that the courts have the power to either
remand the application or make a determination on the matter,226 it makes
sense that courts would retain exclusive jurisdiction over § 1447(b) matters
unless the court decided to remand the matter to USCIS.227 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit made a compelling point: Why would Congress even place the
word “remand” in the statutory text if in fact USCIS were to have concurrent
jurisdiction with the courts throughout § 1447(b) actions?228 In essence, under
a concurrent-jurisdiction interpretation, the courts would have nothing to
remand to USCIS because USCIS would have the power to “remand” the case
to itself.229 As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “When we ‘remand’ a case to the
district court . . . we do so because the district court has lost jurisdiction once
we acquire it upon the filing of a proper notice of appeal . . . The most natural
reading is that Congress used the term ‘remand’ in the same sense.”230 Thus,
under this analysis, USCIS has no jurisdiction once a § 1447(b) action is
filed.231 Moreover, by analyzing the definition of the word “remand” in such a
context, courts have found that a portion of the statute would be rendered
meaningless, which cannot be done, as every word in a statute must be given
full effect.232
In terms of statutory construction, the court in Bustamante concluded in
part that § 1447(b) gives both the courts and USCIS jurisdiction over
naturalization applications because the word “exclusive” was not mentioned in
the statutory text.233 While the language of § 1447(b) does not include the
words “exclusive jurisdiction” as do other statutes,234 the absence of such
language should not have factored into the court’s analysis of whether §
1447(b) actions vest courts with exclusive jurisdiction.235 Although such an
analysis on its face may be compelling, the court in Bustamante failed to note
that the words “concurrent jurisdiction” are nowhere found within the text of
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
227. See U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Etape v. Chertoff,
497 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 2007).
228. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Etape, 497 F.3d at 384.
233. Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
234. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8477(e)(7)(A) (2006) (“The district courts of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subsection.”); 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(2) (2006)
(“Such appropriate district court of the United States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all actions for any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death arising out of, relating
to, or resulting from an act of terrorism . . . .”); 7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (2006) (“The United States
district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of actions brought under this section.”).
235. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
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the statute either.236 By determining that both the courts and USCIS have
jurisdiction in § 1447(b) actions due to the fact that the words “exclusive
jurisdiction” are not explicitly referenced to in the statute,237 the opposite
interpretation – that the courts have exclusive jurisdiction over § 1447(b)
actions – could be true as well, since the statute does not explicitly state the
words “concurrent jurisdiction.”238 Congress has used the words “concurrent
jurisdiction” in some statutes,239 just as it has used the words “exclusive
jurisdiction” in others.240 Moreover, the text of the statute explicitly states
“[s]uch court has jurisdiction over the matter.”241 Because USCIS is not a
court, it can be inferred from the text that this phrase does in fact explicitly
give the courts exclusive jurisdiction, since the statute does not say that USCIS
has jurisdiction.242 Thus, Bustamante’s textual reading of § 1447(b) is less
than compelling in terms of statutory construction.
Also, as touched upon in Hovsepian, by finding that USCIS and the courts
have concurrent jurisdiction, the delay could be even longer if USCIS denies a
naturalization application in the course of a proceeding.243 Ultimately, if the
petitioner wishes to appeal a denial on his or her naturalization application, the
applicant must “request a hearing before an immigration officer.”244 If the
petitioner’s application is once again denied, only then can the petitioner go
before a district court for a review of USCIS’s decision.245 More than likely,
by giving USCIS jurisdiction with the courts, in this scenario, the delay in
adjudicating the naturalization process would be even longer, as the applicant
would have to exhaust all administrative requirements before requesting a
hearing by the court. Although the court in Bustamante did not find this
argument compelling, due to the fact that there was no evidence showing that
most applications are denied and no evidence that most courts actually
determine the matter for themselves, many applications will in fact be denied,
which would inevitably cause the naturalization process to be dragged on even
further. And, even if the court does not decide the matter for itself and instead

236. See id. at 376–77. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006).
237. See Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 376–77.
238. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).
239. See id. The words “concurrent jurisdiction” are in many federal statutes. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3241 (2006) (stating that the district courts in the Virgin Islands have concurrent
jurisdiction with the district courts of the U.S. for offenses of the high seas); 38 U.S.C. § 8112
(2000) (allowing both the states and the federal governments to have concurrent jurisdiction over
certain areas of veterans’ benefits).
240. See supra text accompanying note 235.
241. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).
242. See id.
243. United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
244. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a).
245. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006).
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decides to remand the case to USCIS, interpreting the statute to mean that the
courts have exclusive jurisdiction still falls in line with Congress’s intent of
giving applicants judicial recourse.246 Thus, once again, Congress’s overall
intent of speeding up the naturalization process would be undermined by
allowing USCIS to have concurrent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, throughout the majority of the United States’ history, courts
have played a role in the naturalization process. Prior to the Immigration Act
of 1990, an individual could only gain citizenship by court approval.247
Although Congress enacted an agency to aid the courts in naturalization
procedures,248 from 1790249 until 1990250 courts had the final say on ultimately
who could become a U.S. citizen. However, by taking the courts out of
making initial determinations on who could or could not become a citizen,251
Congress recognized that removing the courts from naturalization matters was
not an easy thing.252 As stated in a House Report that led to the elimination of
“initial” court adjudications on naturalization applications, “[r]emoval of the
200-year-old naturalization process from the Judiciary is not a step taken
lightly by the Committee. The Committee notes the important role the Courts
have performed in the past of welcoming citizens to the U.S.”253 As the
Committee noted, the backlog in the courts’ dockets, which caused delays in
the naturalization process led to the demise of the court systems’ role in
naturalization procedures.254 Congress, although granting USCIS the authority

246. H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 14 (1989).
247. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795); Naturalization Act of
June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 3, 34 Stat. 596.
248. See § 1, 34 Stat. 596 (“That the designation of the Bureau of Immigration in the
Department of Commerce and Labor is hereby changed to the ‘Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization,’ . . . [and it] shall have charge of all matters concerning the naturalization of
aliens.”).
249. See 1 Stat. 103 (“That any alien being a free white person . . . for the term of two years,
may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any common law court of
record”); LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that the Act of March 26,
1790 was “the first federal activity in an area previously under the control of the individual
states”).
250. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006) (“The employee [of
USCIS] designated to conduct any such examination shall make a determination as to whether the
application should be granted or denied, with reasons therefor.”).
251. See id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006) (giving courts the power to review denials of
naturalization applications, as opposed to giving the courts the power to make an initial
determination on naturalization applications); 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006) (giving courts the power
to review naturalization applications after USCIS fails to make a decision on a naturalization
application, as opposed to giving the courts the power to make an initial determination on
naturalization applications).
252. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8 (1989).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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to grant citizenship, “recognized the longstanding power the district courts had
possessed over naturalization applications and so provided . . . that district
courts retained their power to review an application if an applicant so
chose.”255
If in fact naturalization adjudications were stripped away from the courts
due to delays in determinations on applications, Congress’s plan of speeding
up the naturalization process has ultimately fallen flat on its face. In 1989, a
House Report stated, “[f]ully qualified applicants must wait two years in some
places to be sworn in as a U.S. citizen,”256 and it is clear that delays are equally
as bad, if not worse, now than they were in 1989. This can be seen from
individuals like Zuhair Mah’d, who waited over two years to obtain his
citizenship.257 Thus, if congressional members stripped the courts’ power to
adjudicate naturalization applications with a heavy heart in order to speed up
the naturalization process,258 it makes sense that the courts should retain
exclusive jurisdiction over § 1447(b) matters. Congress stripped the courts’
power to adjudicate naturalization applications when Congress decided to give
USCIS the power to adjudicate naturalization applications due to adjudication
delays in the courts.259 Thus, if there is a delay at the agency level in the
adjudication of naturalization applications, it can be viewed that § 1447(b) is
meant to strip USCIS of its jurisdictional power. Since the courts were
stripped of their power to adjudicate naturalization applications due to delays,
USCIS should also be stripped of its jurisdictional power over the application
due to its delay. This can only be done if the courts find that § 1447(b) vests
the courts with exclusive jurisdiction.
By giving USCIS concurrent
jurisdiction with the courts on delayed naturalization determinations, the courts
in essence are diverging from what Congress did to the courts in 1990 by
taking away the courts’ power to decide applications.
Furthermore, USCIS now conducts interviews after it obtains the results of
applicants’ name checks, due to the number of lawsuits brought under §
1447(b).260 As stated earlier, FBI name checks, which are only a portion of the
background check, usually account for the delay.261 Since USCIS is only

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 386 (4th Cir. 2007).
H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8.
NPR, supra note 1.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8.
See id. at 10.
Morawetz, supra note 22, at 457. See also Memo on Background Checks, supra note 74.
See AILF LEGAL ACTION CENTER, MANDAMUS JURISDICTION OVER DELAYED
APPLICATIONS: RESPONDING TO THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 2 (July 23, 2009),
http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/mandamus-jurisdiction9-24-07%20PA.pdf.
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responsible for delays that occur after the initial examination,262 the
naturalization process will be further delayed by USCIS’s new policy. This
manipulation of the system by USCIS frustrates Congress’s intent of speeding
up the naturalization process.263 Thus, due to USCIS’s attempt to thwart §
1447(b) actions by conducting name checks before the initial interview, delays
in the naturalization process can be even longer, and the courts should take
over the matter exclusively to combat USCIS’s new policy.
B.

Adjudicating the Application

Understandably, national security is a great concern in deciding whether or
not to grant an individual citizenship, especially in a post-9/11 world. This is
why many courts, such as Manzoor,264 have chosen to remand applications to
USCIS as opposed to adjudicating the applications. Many courts believe
USCIS is in a better position than the courts to analyze the background-check
results from the FBI.265 For example, in Manzoor, the court stated that it was
“not equipped to conduct background checks of naturalization applicants.”266
However, as stated by the Fourth Circuit, USCIS “can utilize its expertise by
presenting its findings to the court” in § 1447(b) proceedings.267 Moreover, for
the courts that are unwilling to accept this argument, those courts should
recognize that when the courts had the sole power to adjudicate naturalization
applications, the courts utilized the agency’s recommendations and
determinations in deciding whether to grant a naturalization application.268
Furthermore, in those cases where a name check or any other background
check has not yet been completed, USCIS can order the FBI to expedite the
name check.269 Therefore, if USCIS orders the FBI to expedite a name check,
presumably the courts can use the results of the name check to make a
determination on the application. And, because USCIS does in fact have the
ability to request that the FBI expedite a name check, the courts should
definitely take over the matter, because it is unreasonable for USCIS to not
have requested such an expedition when applicants have waited long periods of
time to receive a determination on their application.270 Once the courts receive

262. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006) (“If there is a failure to make a determination . . . before the
end of the 120-day period after the date on which the examination is conducted . . . the applicant
may apply to the United States district court . . . for a hearing on the matter.”) (emphasis added).
263. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 457.
264. Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (E.D. Va. 2007).
265. See id. at 808.
266. Id.
267. Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, 581 F. Supp. 2d 243, 246 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting Etape v.
Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2007)).
268. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 453.
269. See Ali v. Frazier, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (D. Minn. 2008).
270. See id. at 1095–96.
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the results from the FBI check, they can utilize USCIS’s expertise to determine
whether or not the application should be granted.271
However, exactly how great a threat are these naturalization applicants to
our nation’s security? Before an individual can even become a naturalized
U.S. citizen, the individual must have lived in the U.S. as a permanent resident
for at least five years.272 Individuals applying for permanent-resident status
must undergo FBI background checks, which includes name and fingerprint
checks.273 As is the case for naturalization applications, the FBI hands the
results of the background checks over to USCIS to rule on permanent-resident
status adjustments.274 Although these checks are valid for only 15 months,275 it
is clear that individuals applying for citizenship have already gone through
security checks in order to be permitted to stay in the United States as
permanent residents.
Concerning FBI background-check delays for
naturalization applications, an attorney for the ACLU stated, “We should
remember, these are people who’ve been living here in the U.S. with green
cards for at least five years. And so it doesn’t make sense that a delay is going
to protect us from national security threats.”276 Thus, while national security is
not a matter to be taken lightly, courts should make a note that naturalization
applicants (if in fact legal permanent residents) have already undergone
security checks in the past; if such individuals were such a huge threat to the
nation’s security, more than likely they would not be in the U.S.
Also, as is the case with concurrent jurisdiction, remanding the case to
USCIS has the potential to frustrate Congress’s intent of speeding up the
naturalization process. When in fact USCIS is waiting for background-check
conclusions, many courts will remand the case to USCIS and give USCIS
vague instructions. For example, in some cases, the courts have ordered
USCIS to promptly make a decision on the application once the FBI
background checks are complete.277 Thus, in all actuality, the petitioner could
have to wait longer to receive a decision from USCIS, as “promptly” is not
always defined in terms of a time limit. Furthermore, when courts remand the
case to USCIS, the applicant must then wait for USCIS to make a decision,
which further delays the process; there would be no more delays if the court
simply decided the issue of citizenship. Even more troubling than this is if
after the remand, USCIS decides to deny the applicant citizenship, then the
271. See Taalebinezhaad, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
272. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006).
273. Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1049–50 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Sasser, supra note
51, at 2517.
274. See Sasser, supra note 51, at 2518.
275. Sasser, supra note 51, at 2519.
276. NPR, supra note 1 (quoting Cecillia Wang).
277. See Elmehelmy v. Quarantillo, No. 08-0386 (GEB), 2008 WL 5188850, at *4 (D. N.J.
Dec. 10, 2008).
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applicant would have to exhaust all appeals at the agency level before bringing
an appeal in a district court. In essence, this long struggle could be “nipped in
the bud” if the court decided to determine the application for itself. Thus, once
again, we see that Congress’s intent of streamlining the process and curbing
delays would be frustrated.
By handing the case over to USCIS, the courts are giving USCIS more
time to adjudicate naturalization applications and, at the same time, could give
USCIS less incentive to make a decision on an application. In essence, if the
majority of courts remand naturalization applications in § 1447(b) cases,
USCIS will still be able to make a decision on the application as opposed to the
courts.278 Furthermore, by remanding the case to USCIS, the only thing that
really changes is that the court may give USCIS a timetable to make a
determination on the application. However, while this decision may seem
satisfactory to some, many applicants may not be so understanding because
giving USCIS more time seems to undermine the whole point of the § 1447(b)
action–to receive a determination on their application due to the failure of
USCIS to make a determination on the application. The courts should
recognize that “a presumption of remand in delay cases undermines the
statutory scheme of ready access to the courts in those cases.”279 In a way, it is
almost disturbing that the courts would remand the case back to USCIS,
because didn’t USCIS have its chance to make a decision on the application
and fail to do so? Shouldn’t the courts adjudicate the application as a lesson to
the agency to adjudicate the applications in a timelier manner?
Even though USCIS does not have the authority to adjudicate a
naturalization application until all background checks are complete, as
addressed by Manzoor,280 § 1447(b) does not require that a background be
complete in order for a court to adjudicate the application. As stated earlier,
while many courts refrain from adjudicating the application due to incomplete
background checks, this should not stop the courts from adjudicating the
application since USCIS has authority to expedite the name-check process.281
Furthermore, USCIS’s own regulation states that a “decision to grant or deny
the application shall be made at the time of the initial examination or within
120-days after the date of the initial examination.”282 Moreover, 8 U.S.C. §
1571(b) states that it “is the sense of Congress that the processing of an
immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days
after the initial filing of the application.”283 Therefore, regarding delayed name

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 458.
Id.
Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 809 (E.D. Va. 2007).
See Ali v. Frazier, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (D. Minn. 2008).
8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) (2008).
8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2006).
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checks, USCIS should follow its own policy, as well as Congress’s intentions,
and expedite the name check to ensure that individuals receive a timely
response on their naturalization application.
In-line with Manzoor’s worries that USCIS would change its policy of
interviewing applicants before the completion of name-check results if the
court decided to adjudicate the application,284 USCIS has since changed its
policy and now conducts name checks before the initial interview.285 This is
an attempt on the part of USCIS to evade § 1447(b) actions.286 Despite the fact
that the majority of courts have remanded applications to USCIS, USCIS
nonetheless decided to change its policy of interviewing applicants prior to the
FBI’s name checks. Courts should recognize that USCIS is taking advantage
of the system and frustrating Congress’s intent of speeding up the
naturalization process. The new policy frustrates Congress’s intent because for
§ 1447(b) actions, the 120-day clock will not start running until after both the
name check and initial interview are complete. Thus, now, applicants will
more than likely have to wait even longer to receive a determination on their
application and must wait longer before they can bring a § 1447(b) action in a
district court. Since the name check will be completed by the time the §
1447(b) action has been initiated, the courts should take over the application
and determine whether to grant or deny the application.
Finally, if a court awards a petitioner citizenship instead of remanding the
application to USCIS, the applicant may be able to recover attorney’s fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).287 The EAJA was enacted to
encourage individuals to utilize the court system when their constitutional or
statutory rights are violated.288 Because the EAJA provides that a prevailing
party against an agency may recover attorney’s fees,289 this statute obviously
can benefit prevailing applicants in § 1447(b) actions. However, in some
cases, if an application has been remanded to USCIS with no instructions from
the court to grant or deny the application, a court might not consider the
applicant to be a prevailing party, even if the applicant is awarded
citizenship.290 Without § 1447(b) actions, virtually nothing would be in

284. In part of the court’s decision to remand the case to USCIS, the court believed that if it
did not remand the case to USCIS, it would prompt USCIS to change its policy of interviewing
applicants before the background checks to interviewing the applicants after the background
checks were complete. See Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 808–09.
285. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 457 n.54; Memo on Background Checks, supra note 74.
286. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 457; Memo on Background Checks, supra note 74.
287. See Othman v. Chertoff, 309 F. App’x 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2008).
288. Letter from Walter H. Eason, Jr., President/CEO of EAJA, Limitations of the Equal
Access to Justice Act Are So Great as to Deny Equal Access to Justice, Inc., to U.S. Citizen (Mar.
15, 2005), http://www.equalaccess2justice.us/cgi-bin/index.cgi?page=EAJA+Information.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
290. See Othman, 309 F. App’x at 794.
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USCIS’s way to further delay naturalization adjudications, and since the EAJA
encourages individuals to bring actions against agencies when individuals’
rights are violated, the court could potentially deter § 1447(b) actions. This is
so because individuals with low incomes may not bring § 1447(b) actions in
fear that they will not receive compensation for attorney’s fees if the court
remands the case to USCIS. Thus, courts should take this into account when
deciding whether to remand the case to USCIS or to adjudicate the application.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the course of the United States’ history, courts have played at
least some role in the naturalization process. Once, that role was big, but
slowly over time, that role has dwindled. Recognizing the important role that
courts have played in the naturalization process, courts should keep in mind
that their role as primary adjudicators in determining naturalization
applications only ended when the courts became backlogged and were unable
to adjudicate naturalization petitions in a timely manner. Thus, by finding that
the courts and USCIS have concurrent jurisdiction in § 1447(b) actions, a great
irony and tragedy would be present, for the exact reason an applicant brings a §
1447(b) suit is because USCIS did not adjudicate the naturalization application
in a timely manner. Essentially, such a delay in the adjudication of
naturalization applications is precisely why the courts were stripped of their
power to determine naturalization applications almost twenty years ago.
Furthermore, by looking at the statutory language, statutory context, and
legislative intent of § 1447(b), it only makes sense that courts retain exclusive
jurisdiction over such matters.
Additionally, in deciding to remand applications to USCIS, in many ways
the courts could drag out the naturalization process even further by requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies before making an appeal before a
district court. Ultimately, such a determination on the denied application could
have been made if the court had simply determined the matter for itself initially
in the § 1447(b) action. While security seems to be the major reason why
courts have decided to remand applications to USCIS, courts still have the
ability to determine applications while still protecting the nation’s security by
utilizing USCIS’s expertise. Moreover, in situations where the background
results have not been completed, the courts can have USCIS request that the
name checks be expedited.
The courts should thus take back the power they once had to adjudicate
naturalization applications to send a message to USCIS that delays in
naturalization adjudications will not be tolerated–just as Congress did to the
courts almost twenty years ago. However, not only should courts take over §
1447(b) matters to prove a point to USCIS, but the courts should adjudicate the
applications for the countless number of individuals who have been waiting for
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years to become U.S. citizens. Although Zuhair Mah’d’s story ended happily
ever after, there are still others out there who are waiting.
JESSICA SCHNEIDER

 B.A., May 2005, University of Tennessee; J.D., May 2010, Saint Louis University School of
Law. Many thanks to Professor Amany Ragab Hacking for her guidance and expertise on this
issue and to Chris and my parents for their love, patience, and unconditional support.

